Reproduced with permission from
the United Nations Research Institute for Social
Development
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Authoritarian
Rule and Democracy in Africa: A Theoretical Discourse
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1. Conceptualizing
the Basis of Authoritarian Rule and Democracy
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1.1 The
democratic question There is an awakening
of interest in democratic theory and politics in Africa. Military and one-party régimes
are faced with serious problems of legitimation, stemming from the crisis of the social
contract that underpinned their post-colonial models of development. A variety of social
groups are seeking protection against state repression and calling for alternatives to the
structural adjustment programmes launched in the 1980s. Yet, until very recently,
following the democratic uprisings in Eastern Europe, very few countries had followed the
Latin American and Asian examples of establishing frameworks for transitions to democratic
rule. What accounts for the dominance of authoritarian rule in Africa? Under what
conditions is democracy likely to emerge and remain stable? I question received theories
that ruled out democratic possibilities in Africa because of the logic of modernization or
dependence, and those that currently try to establish a positive relationship between
structural adjustment and democracy.
I begin by constructing a framework for theorizing the
problems of authoritarianism and democracy. I situate the argument at the level of the
organization of economic enterprises, with particular focus on forms of accumulation. I
relate these to socio-political processes that influence the development of state-civil
society relations and social contracts, giving rise to either authoritarian or democratic
rule. I argue that although underdevelopment per se should not constitute a fundamental
obstacle to democratization, the establishment of stable and sustainable democracy
requires substantial changes in the forms of accumulation, the promotion of an acceptable
level of welfare that will allow the majority of the people to have confidence in the
capacity of democratic institutions to manage economic, social, and political conflicts;
and the resolution of the contradictions between authoritarian relations that are dominant
at the political sphere and nascent liberal pressures that are to be found in civil
society.
In the second part, I examine the stages in the
development of authoritarianism and democratization, emphasizing the changing strengths of
the national coalitions for democracy. In the third and final part, I focus on the
problems of democratization in crisis economies, with a Nigerian case study. I conclude by
examining the case for linking struggles waged around questions of formal democracy with
those that focus on aspirations for broader and more substantive forms of popular rule.
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1.2
Accumulation, authoritarianism and democracy Wealth creation is an integral part of class formation. It embodies
relations of domination and subordination. Social and political life largely depends on
how material production is organized and the methods used in reproducing/defending
advantages and minimizing/overturning disadvantages. The relevant question becomes whether
dominant groups use authoritarian or democratic methods in regulating their business
practices, and whether disadvantaged groups can freely pursue their interests and improve
upon their life chances through open and non-repressive forms of transactions. The way
production and business activities are organized have implications for the organization of
civil society and state power.
Authoritarianism and democracy represent opposing modes of
regulating conflicts thrown up by the dynamics of accumulation and development. These
dynamics are strongly instrumentalist. Social groups and political authorities opt for
democratic strategies if the latter can protect their advantages or minimize their losses
in the economy and society (Beckman, 1989). Struggles are waged over questions of
representation and accountability, and the right to free expression and organization.
Although democracy is primarily concerned with the rules and institutions that allow for
open competition and participation in government, it also embodies social and economic
characteristics that are crucial in determining its capacity to survive.
Three major processes appear to be central to democratic
transitions from authoritarian military and one-party régimes: the demilitarization of
social and political life; the liberalization of civil society; and the democratization of
the rules governing political and economic competition. The first concerns the supremacy
and regulation of civilian governmental authority; the second with the democratization of
the state apparatus and the relative freedom of civil organizations; and the third with
the capacity to democratically manage conflicts in civil and political society and
economic practices. I argue, at this stage, the need to approach the question of democracy
from its antithesis. Why has authoritarian rule persisted in Africa? |
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1.3 The
structural roots of authoritarianism I
focus the discussion on the structural foundations of authoritarianism and situate the
analysis within what I consider to be the three principal forms of accumulation in Africa.
I identify these forms of accumulation as wage-exploitative monopolistic practices,
incorporating both national and transnational enterprises; rent-seeking state capitalism;
and the regulation of petty commodity production. The three encourage the growth of
authoritarian values. Authoritarianism is inherent in the first two, whereas it expresses
itself in petty production primarily in the way such petty production is linked with the
reproduction of ruling classes that are organized around the state, local communities and
markets.
Transnational firms embody the problems of economic
concentration which Marxist and corporate theories of the firm have highlighted. Dahl has
argued that "with very few exceptions, the internal governments of economic
enterprises are flatly undemocratic both de jure and de facto" (Dahl, 1985: 55). The
ownership and management structures of transnationals deepen inequalities and undermine
effective participation in the governance of the enterprises.
The rise of the transnational firm led to profound changes
in Western social structures and the relationship between markets and states. Habermas,
for instance, contends that the quest for stable accumulation and political order required
the state to supplant the market as the principal steering mechanism for the social and
economic system and to effect "a partial class compromise" through welfare
programmes and high wage levels that are set "quasi politically" (Habermas,
1973).
Habermas foresees a legitimation crisis arising from the
state's support for accumulation while simultaneously attempting to legitimate itself to
the populace. Such a crisis threatens the democratic order of Western societies. There is
little doubt, however, that the structural incorporation of the working class in the
management of modern economies has helped to check the anti-democratic tendencies of
transnational firms in Western societies.
The problems of transnational monopolies are, however,
accentuated in developing countries by the firms' supranational authority which
compromises national sovereignty and allows managers to impose authoritarian régimes of
industrial relations at the work place. The limited transformations of African economies
by transnational capital produced a small labour force, unable to influence the state to
regulate the anti-worker practices of multinational companies. Most decisions are taken by
employers with little or no input from the work force. The principles of collective
bargaining are poorly developed as many unions still grapple with the problems of
recognition and organization and the right to participate in the determination of working
conditions. Industrial disputes are more often resolved by methods of co-optation and
repression than by democratic persuasion and bargaining.1
The second mode of accumulation highlights the way
dominant groups in the economy and society appropriate rent through the state.
Transnational and local firms may combine the formal modes of surplus appropriation with
the siphoning of public resources. Neo-classical political economists associate economic
distortions in developing economies with the emergence of powerful urban coalitions who
use their privileged access to state resources to exploit rural communities (Bates, 1981;
Lofchie, 1989). Rent-seeking activities, it is argued, cause developing economies to
operate at sub-optimal levels (Bhagwati, 1982; Buchanan, 1980).
Tornquist has analyzed, at the wider political context,
the different types of rent-seeking activities employed by various socio-political groups
in India and Indonesia and their implications for authoritarian and democratic forms of
rule (Tornquist, 1988). Toyo and Iyayi, examining the phenomenon in Nigeria, demonstrate
that rent capitalism, which they call primitive accumulation, takes the form of contract
inflation, the appropriation and valorization of land, and the use of bureaucratic
positions for corrupt enrichment (Toyo, 1985; Iyayi, 1986). Patron-client relations,
sometimes ethnic based, but often cross-national, are built into the alliances for the
control and administration of state power. Ibrahim has shown how the methods described by
Toyo and Iyayi were used by the leading groups in the ruling National Party of Nigeria to
consolidate their grip on the political system of Nigeria's Second Republic (Ibrahim,
1988). The state became a central organ in private accumulation and class formation. It is
in this sense that Ake talks about the over-politicization of African economies (Ake,
1987). The state is subjected to non-Weberian values of irrationality, inefficiency and
disorder. Constitutionalism and the rule of law, central to democratic politics, fails to
take root in the body politic.
The petty commodity sector presents a contradictory
picture. Its authoritarian character is discussed mainly in the context of its
incorporation into the modern economy. I use the concept of petty commodity production in
a broad sense to cover activities in which producers are basically self-employed, rely on
family or non-waged labour, and use rudimentary tools and skills to sustain their
livelihood. These activities embody several complex social relations and straddle both
urban and rural areas. They include peasant production and informal sector activities.
Colonial historiography traces the constraints on African development to the traditional
values embedded in the social practices of the actors in these enterprises.
A more sophisticated version of the thesis combines
fragments of historical materialism with modernization theory to highlight the resilience
of the "peasant mode of production", and the need for a proper capitalist
revolution to overcome the problems of underdevelopment, corruption and authoritarianism
(Hyden, 1983). "Tribalism", an impediment to democracy and accumulation, is
understood to be a direct attribute of the "relations of affection", rooted in "pre-capitalist"
values and practices. The contemporary African state is projected as a pathetically poor
modernizer as it has failed to "capture" the small-scale producers buried in
these "relations of affection".
Other scholars and peasant-oriented activists contend that
some of the essential values of small-scale farming societies are conducive to the growth
of a democratic culture and practice (Berg-Schlosser, 1985). Nyerere based his strategy of
Ujamma, for instance, on the "democratic" and growth potentials of peasant
social relations (Nyerere, 1967). Informal democratic processes are, undoubtedly, present
in many peasant societies, expressed specifically in the way collective decisions are
taken in the governance of common resources and the resolution of conflicts. Others with a
neo-liberal outlook argue that the proliferation of non-governmental organizations and
independent small-scale producers, following the crisis and market reforms, will
eventually provide the foundations for the establishment of democracy (Bratton, 1989a,b).
Both perspectives ignore the way petty commodity
activities have been structured historically, being subjected to various layers of
authority as capitalism and the state penetrate the countryside. The limitations of Hyden's
central concepts and thesis have already been exposed by a host of authors (Williams,
1987; Kasfir, 1986; Mamdani, 1985; Cliffe, 1987; Beckman, 1988; Himmelstrand, 1989). The
optimism of the neo-liberals in seeing the informal sector as the vanguard for democracy
and for surviving the African crisis is also being seriously challenged (Meager, 1990;
Mustapha, 1990).
Mamdani has shown, with particular reference to Uganda,
the rigidities in agrarian social relations brought about by the undemocratic character of
the rural power structures (Mamdani, 1986 and 1987). Similar studies for other countries
show the authoritarian content of the structures that pull the peasantry into the national
economies and the world market. The interests of the groups that dominate transnational
monopolies and state projects hold sway in the petty commodity sector. Such interests
block the development of the democratic potential of independent small-scale production.
The values of communal life are manipulated by the dominant groups to sustain support for
their struggles over political offices and economic resources. Hyden's "tribalists",
far from being the product of "pre-capitalist relations of affection", are
rather the creation of modern conditions and activities (Mamdani, 1985; Eke, 1975).
Patron-client relations regulate peasant production and incomes and facilitate the
administration of state power. Clientelism prevents self-development and social
independence, critical for the construction of democracy. |
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1.4 The basis
for democratic struggles The authoritarian
thrust of the three forms of accumulation is, however, not incontestable. Disadvantaged
social groups challenge authoritarian rule and advance alternative, sometimes democratic,
forms of politics. I try to capture the structural basis of such struggles in the
contradictions that are inherent in three forms of accumulation. Pressures for
democratization are not exclusively confined to the politics of subordinate groups.
Business groups may also play active roles in democratization, depending on the changing
nature of the forms of accumulation and the capacity of the political system to manage
conflicts between the dominant groups.
Tornquist has argued that in discussions on classes and
democracy, it is more important to highlight "how capitalists...try to gain and
protect their economic strength" than to emphasize, as Martinussen does in his study
on India and Pakistan (Martinussen, 1980), the strength of the national bourgeoisie and
its political forms of organization (Tornquist, 1985). The dependence of Indonesian
capitalists, and by extension their Pakistani counterparts, on rent-seeking activities is
interpreted as the basis for the failure of democracy in both societies. But in countries
such as South Korea and Taiwan, province of China, where wage labour has been sufficiently
generalized and where vital sectors of industry are manned by skilled employees,
entrepreneurs may be forced to accommodate the popular pressures for democracy as a
trade-off for industrial stability (Lindstrom, 1989; Cheng, 1989). Most countries of
Africa share the Pakistani and Indonesian characteristics. The popular classes may become
the primary force for democratization in such societies.
But how does one conceptualize the basis for
democratization in order not to arrive at deterministic formulations? How do pressures for
authoritarianism and democracy translate themselves at the level of civil society and the
state? Barrington Moore has demonstrated that a single mode of accumulation, situated
within specific historical contexts, can give rise to complex patterns of societal
development, and that it is the latter that is the primary determinant of the political
forms of organization (Moore, 1966). Moore's work shares some affinity with Gramsci's,
whose major contribution to democratic theory is his retrieval of the concept of civil
society, which Marx had, following its dominant usage at the time, equated with material
relations. Gramsci situates civil society outside the realm of both material relations and
state power. Yet in contradistinction to liberal thought, he sees civil society as the "soft
underbelly of the capitalist system" (Pelczynski, 1988). Civil society offers the
popular classes an opportunity to deny the ruling class hegemony in the realm of ideas,
values and culture, as a basis for the ultimate seizure of power and the transformation of
capitalist property relations and the state. The emphasis Gramsci places on civil society
has led many critics to counterpoise his theory of politics to that of Marx (Bobbio,
1988).
I argue that the basis for authoritarian rule should be
located primarily at the level of material relations, which in the framework I have
sketched, represents the contradictions in the forms of accumulation. But the dynamics of
authoritarian rule and struggles for democratization develop at the level of civil
society. Workers organize themselves into unions and contest the power of transnational
capital at the work place and in the wider society. The defence of seemingly economic
interests wages and welfare draws workers and their unions into the arena of
democratic politics. They demand for accountability, independent union organization and
the right to free expression and collective bargaining, critical for the resolution of
wage and welfare disputes.
Similarly, rent-seeking activities generate their own
intractable problems. Firstly, the expansion of state expenditure creates a public-sector
labour force which shares similar concerns with workers in transnational firms for the
establishment of institutionalized frameworks to promote reasonable working conditions.
Secondly, state capitalism creates a large middle class of teachers, journalists, lawyers,
doctors and students, who yearn for professional competence and autonomy. Thirdly, the
state itself may be caught up in a "fiscal crisis" that is structural, having to
defend both the demands of accumulation and the need for public revenue (O'Connor, 1973).
Rent-seeking activities may compound the fiscal crisis of
the state, and may threaten the jobs, incomes and working conditions of the groups that
owe their livelihood to the public sector. Such groups are likely to be critical, in the
long run, of corruption, inefficiency and mismanagement. Rent-seeking methods become
illegitimate as the perpetrators of corruption, usually discredited ruling groups and
private entrepreneurs, come under public censure. Probes on corruption are, in fact, very
common in contemporary African politics. They open up possibilities for the democratic
allocation of resources.
Finally, the politics of patronage at the sphere of petty
commodity production can be undermined by the very logic of transnational and state
capitalist penetration of that sector. Two tendencies may be at work here. The
authoritarian structures that incorporate peasant and small-scale producers into the
modern economy may be in conflict with the demands for autonomy, free transactions and
secure welfare that modes of self-employment usually generate. African history is replete
with peasant revolts against unfair prices, arbitrary land acquisitions and authoritarian
rule. Similarly, the resultant social differentiation and sharp inequalities in resource
use may produce an agricultural labour class and new rural alliances, possibly linked to
mass urban social movements, and pressures for democratization.
1 I make no distinction between local and foreign capital in terms of the
organizational practices of their enterprises and their policies toward labour. In fact,
several studies have shown that indigenous firms tend to be more contemptuous of the
rights of workers to form labour unions. See, for instance, Olukoshi, 1986.
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