Nigeria is one of the few African countries whose leaders have tried to link democratization with structural adjustment. Democratization in the late 1970s produced a civilian régime that lasted only four years. But the two transitions and the circumstances that produced them are different. The democratic experiment of 1979-83 coincided with extensive state interventions in the economy. Democratization was carried out in the context of massive oil revenues and booming economic activities. The current experiment is taking place in an environment of industrial crisis (MAN, 1987 and 1989), negative rates of GDP growth, a sharp drop in formal employment and real incomes, an expansion of low value added informal sector activities, and huge cuts in public spending on social development, particularly health and education. Table 5 highlights some of these negative trends.

* Provisional figure. Source: Federal Office of Statistics (Nigeria), Lagos.

The structural adjustment programme launched in 1986 emphasized the principal role of the market in correcting structural distortions and getting the economy out of the crisis. A competitive foreign exchange market is expected to eliminate import licences and the corruption associated with them; privatization and balanced budgets are to end subventions and inflated contracts; and trade liberalization is to allow the principles of comparative advantage to determine production activities and check state support for inefficient firms. Pro-reform theorists contend, therefore, that the state's liberalization programme is in agreement with liberal democratic theory which identifies the market and an enterprising bourgeoisie as conditions for democratic rule (Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 1988; Diamond, 1988).

But is liberal democracy the political shell of structural adjustment? Will market reforms liberate the "political class" and business groups from rent-seeking activities and transform the petty commodity sector into supportive avenues for democratization? If, on the other hand, democracy and structural adjustment are a bad mix, as radical critics argue, what accounts for the military's keen interest in democratization? Why doesn't the military simply implement its economic programme without recourse to democratization? Can the military usher in a successful and stable democratic order? How strong are the popular groups in influencing the direction of the democratization process?  

Central to democratic theory and politics is the question of the supremacy of civil governmental authority over the armed forces. The military is expected to be insulated from politics and civil society in general. But the Nigerian military has been in power for 20 of the country's 30 years of independence. Civil authority collapsed in January 1966 after about five years of self-rule. Military rule lasted until 1979 when civil rule was reconstituted within the framework of a Second Republic. It survived four years before the military again seized power in December 1983. Factional differences led to a coup in 1985 and the launching of both a structural adjustment programme and an elaborate programme of re-democratization, to be completed in 1992. A political bureau was established to monitor a nationwide debate on an appropriate political system. A new constitution was drafted by a Constituent Assembly in which a fifth of the members were appointed by the government. Local government elections were held on non-party basis, followed by the formation of two government-imposed political parties and the promise of elections at state and federal levels. What prospects does the transition programme hold for the demilitarization of the state apparatus? Can the military preside over a democratic transition that will subordinate its role to that of civil political authority?

The military has been a central institution in the development of the state capitalist model of development (Othman, 1989; Turner, 1982; Ekuahare, 1984; Fadahunsi, 1984). It has extended its grip on the national economy through its conquest of state institutions and the award of contracts and company directorships to retired and serving officers. Despite the massive cuts in budget deficits (from 10.3 per cent as a percentage of GDP in 1986 to 2.9 per cent in 1989), the military continues to enjoy a disproportionate share of the federal budget and an array of privileges. The ratio of military expenditure to health and education expenditure was reckoned to be 56 per cent in 1986; and military expenditure as a percentage of GNP rose from 0.2 in 1960 to 1.0 in 1986 (UNDP,1990). The military's share of the state's capital expenditure jumped from 0.8 per cent in 1986 to 4.6 per cent in 1988. That of internal security jumped from a mere 0.1 per cent to 3.9 per cent. These figures contrast sharply with education's share which fell from 4.3 per cent to 3.9 per cent and the health sector's share which increased from 0.7 per cent to 1.9 per cent for the same period (CBN, 1988).

A similar picture emerges at the recurrent expenditure sector where the military's share jumped from 9.5 per cent in 1986 to 12.6 per cent in 1987; whereas that of education and health dropped from 6.3 per cent and 3.2 per cent to 2.3 per cent and 0.4 per cent respectively. Defence took a relatively hard knock in the reflationary budget of 1988, following widespread protests, enjoying 6.9 per cent of the total compared to 7.5 per cent and 2.2 per cent for education and health respectively (CBN, 1988).

Many of the corporate strategies of consolidating the military's dominance in the society and polity gained momentum after the transition programme was launched. These strategies include the establishment of the defence, air force and naval academies, the procurement of an armoured carrier assembly plant, the formation of a research development cell within the defence ministry, the proposal to have an army bank, and the expansion of the output capacity of the defence industry corporation (Othman, 1987). Military officers are also being posted to the diplomatic service and appointed to head parastatal organizations. They also sit on the councils and boards of educational establishments and social service institutions.

It is not surprising that several Nigerian scholars and politicians see the military as a brute fact of life – an alternative political party to the civilians.⁴ Ideas of a civil-military diarchy have even been advocated by prominent politicians and business groups as a framework for political stability (Ibrahim, 1986; Bangura, 1986). Popular consciousness questions, however, the expansive presence of the military in civic life. Conflicts have erupted between civilians and military personnel, resulting, in several cases, in considerable loss of life and the violation of legal procedures and civil liberties. (Newswatch, 1989a).

Democratization has been coloured with strong authoritarian practices. Elected local council chairmen have either been dismissed,⁵ or not sworn in by military governors even when the councillors get favourable verdicts from the courts.⁶ Other acts of indiscretion include the arbitrary dissolution of all the local government councils before their full tenure and the appointment of sole administrators to run the councils; the creation of a military consultative council to co-exist with the evolving representative civil institutions; and the anomalous situation where the federal military government would have to supervise elected state and local governments between 1990 and 1992.

Why is the military interested in democratization if it cannot tolerate liberal democratic practices and the rule of law? And what are the implications of the authoritarian conduct of the military for the democratization project? Finer has developed a model that seeks to explain why the military institutionalizes or abdicates power. He constructs a matrix of several variables which are related to two summary variables, viz. "dispositions" and "societal conditions", which in turn are related to "motivations" and "necessary conditions". The variables on dispositions include belief in civilian supremacy, threat to the cohesiveness of the military, lack of self-confidence, internal consensus to withdraw from power, and adequate protection of corporate interests. The last two are seen as necessary conditions, while the others are strictly motivational. The societal conditions include internal challenges, external factors, and the availability of a civilian organization to hand over power to. The first two are motivational and the last is a necessary condition (Finer, 1985).

Despite the insights it offers, the model does not fit the Nigerian case. Even though the military is highly visible in most public institutions, the leadership has not abandoned its "stratocratic" character⁷ to rule through a civilian cabinet, a party and a legislature. Nor is the programmed retreat to the barracks a result of the military's belief in civilian supremacy, the threat to the internal coherence of the military,⁸ or its lack of self-confidence. The military's contempt of "bloody civilians" is deep-rooted. Its belief in its capacity to rule has not been seriously dented, as it was in 1974-75. Explanations for the military's interest in democratization should be sought elsewhere.

It seems to me that the political traditions that govern civil-military relations, the irrepressible nature of civil society (Ibrahim, 1989), the circumstances that gave birth to the current régime and the political imperatives of the adjustment programme are crucial factors in explaining the régime's commitment to some form of democratization. Despite the military's profound distrust of civilian rule, a tradition has developed that sees the military as an aberration. Gowon's (1966-75) attempt to postpone indefinitely the return to civil rule precipitated his overthrow in 1975. Buhari's régime (1984-85) also became unpopular when the leadership refused to discuss the question of civil rule as part of the stabilization programme. Babangida's régime (1985-) was forced by the circumstances of its birth and its determination to win popular support to make the issue of civil rule central to its economic programme. The most important factor, I believe, is the political imperative of the structural adjustment programme. It made strategic sense to take the initiative at the political arena in order to prevent the civil groups from emerging as a hegemonic force at the political level. This allowed the régime to co-opt sections of the "political class" to its controversial programme, and confront the more unyielding groups at the terrain of the economy and civil society.

Democratization appears, therefore, to be a strategy to regulate the anticipated popular opposition to the economic reform programme. In this regard, the military wields considerable authority in determining the evolution of the transition plan. The contending political forces that are to form the bedrock of civil governmental authority remain extremely weak. Of the 13 political parties that applied for registration to contest for the slots of the decreed two parties, none attempted to challenge the authority of the military in any significant way. The four dominant parties – the People's Solidarity Party, the Nigerian National Congress, the People's Front of Nigeria and the Liberal Convention – were either reincarnations of old political formations or new outfits for launching new millionaires into politics. The four parties were outspoken, in varying degrees, in their support of the military's economic programme even though it was widely believed they did this for clearly opportunistic reasons. While the Nigeria Labour Party, which was expected to be the mouthpiece of workers and other deprived social groups, remained ambivalent on the question of structural adjustment – the leadership being careful not to antagonize the government and ruin its chances of becoming one of the registered parties (Olukoshi, forthcoming). A major contradiction, therefore, exists between the liberal pressures in civil society and the authoritarian practices at the level of political society. Democratic institutions and values are not likely to grow in such an environment.  

The military, acting through the state, has found it much more difficult to impose its hegemony in civil society. There is generalized dissatisfaction with the economic reforms. Pressures for democratization and the protection of civil liberties are much more potent in the realm of civil society. It will be wrong to counterpoise the state and civil society in absolute terms. Indeed, it is virtually impossible to separate the two spheres, given their inter-penetrability. The state plays a key role in managing all modern economies and in regulating social organizations and the lives of ordinary citizens. But the complex inter-connections between the two spheres does not reduce the state to all facets of civil society. There are several social organizations, covering occupational, household, community, voluntary, gender, media, religious, and ethnic activities that do not fall under the direct control of the state in many societies. Although the class hierarchies in civil society are conditioned by the inequalities in property relations we should also refrain from collapsing civil society with the economy. The state-civil society relationship presents contrasting pictures across socio-economic systems. The state, civil society and the economy should be treated as problematic concepts in order to be able to ask interesting questions about how social groups perceive of the relationships and what their programmes are in restructuring the three spheres.

Neo-liberals talk of civil society in terms of privatization and a market-based economy. But there is no reason why such a limited view of the concept should hold for all theorists and social actors. We have seen in a previous section that for Gramsci, civil society is distinct from the economy and constitutes "the soft underbelly" of bourgeois rule and an arena for people's power. The concept as Keane has recently demonstrated, never in fact had a single unproblematic meaning in classical political thought (Keane, 1988a,b).

There is a wide spectrum of positions in contemporary discources on the relationship between the state and civil society. In Taiwan, democratization led to a slackening of the state's grip on the economy and the strengthening of private civil institutions (Cheng, 1989). Most of the authors of the four volume study on Latin America's transition from authoritarian rule believe the social hegemony of capitalism and the retreat of the socialist revolutionary alternative is what will ultimately consolidate the continent's democratic experiments (O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986). Yet a pre-1989 reform programme of the Solidarity movement in Poland emphasized the need for the transfer of the control and management of factories from the state to democratically elected workers councils, and the introduction of a system of self-management for educational, cultural and media organizations (Pelczynski, 1988).

The Nigerian situation is rather complex. Both the Left and the Right hold statist positions, even though they also advocate for the autonomy of sections of civil society. Nigerian entrepreneurs have combined their statist outlooks with passionate calls for the privatization of public enterprises. Major sections of this group still insist on state protection and adjudication on how the enterprises should be distributed. The Left, of course, sees the state as the custodian of common resources with a mandate to protect popular welfare. The convergence of Left and Right positions on the state should not be surprising. The state is the largest employer of labour, controls substantial resources and an array of social services. Schools, universities, hospitals and vital sections of public transportation would collapse without state support. Industries, commercial enterprises and modern agriculture would not function without the state's funding of the foreign exchange market.

Most urban social groups, such as trade unions, student organizations and academic unions, advocate for the reform of the state apparatus. But they remain extremely critical of the power of the market in effecting the required changes. In fact, their alternative programmes to the current structural adjustment programme insist on an extension of the state sector, under popular control, and the introduction of a planning system (ASUU, 1984; NLC, 1985; NANS, 1984). Such a statist outlook does not prevent them from agitating for the autonomy of their organizations and the defence of the rule of law and civil liberties. Academics, for instance, operate largely within state structures, but agitate for union independence, academic freedom and university autonomy. Workers accept the union structures imposed on them by the state in 1978, but advocate for union autonomy, free collective bargaining and accountability. The same can be said of the judiciary, large sections of the press and religious/ethnic organizations which are heavily dependent on the state for funds and infrastructure support, yet struggle for autonomous civil space to conduct their respective activities. This contradiction between the acceptance of state intervention and the campaign by the disparate social forces for liberal civil relations is underpinned by a complex system of checks and balances which, Ibrahim has argued, "has prevented the rise of tyrannic or even oligarchic régimes at the national level" (Ibrahim, 1990).

How has the military related to the problematic of the state and civil society in the context of its reform programme? The neo-liberal prediction that the market reforms will promote liberalization at the social and political levels has not been borne out by the evidence. Conditionality has certainly increased the tempo of the pressures calling for democratization, but state authorities see such pressures as obstructive of the reforms. The state has intervened in civil society in many instances to control dissent and block the popular will for alternatives (Bangura and Beckman, 1989). Many unions and professional associations have been banned; the state security and transition to civil rule decrees (Nos. 2 and 25) have been used extensively to silence critics; academics and journalists have been dismissed from their jobs on political grounds; students, labour activists, journalists and academics have been consistently arrested and detained; organizations have been formed to undermine industrial strikes and intimidate student activists; and the formation of a special anti-strike squad is being contemplated to control national demonstrations against the adjustment measures (Mustapha, 1988; Ibrahim, 1990).

The state has not been able, however, to impose its hegemony in civil society. State repression is being resisted by several interest groups and voluntary organizations. Internal differences within the military, which at times mirror the geopolitical divisions in the country, help to strengthen the resistance of the civil forces. New organizations have emerged specifically focusing on human rights abuses and civil liberties.⁹ Traditionally conservative organizations, such as the Nigerian Bar Association, are being pulled into the arena of democratic politics (Jega, 1989). There is a radical impulse for democratization struggling for expression and dominance in an atmosphere of controlled political competition.  

A central theme in democratization is the extent to which political actors can develop democratic rules to regulate conflicts emanating from the spheres of production and political society. Existing democracies in Africa and elsewhere are still bedevilled with the problems of managing competition between legitimate political parties (the Gambia, India, Jamaica, Mexico, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe). A culture of "winner takes all" encourages political leaders to be distrustful of each other. The strongest dictates the rules.

Nigeria's current transition programme has not broken with this tradition. Political competition has been restricted to just two parties, appointed by the military. This is in marked contrast to the five parties registered in the Second Republic and the open-party system of the First. Even the rules governing the transition programme remain fluid. Instead of choosing the two parties (itself a restriction in liberalization) from the National Electoral Commission's list of 13 applicants, the state decided to establish two parties whose constitutions, programmes and ideologies were developed by the government and the national electoral commission (Babangida, 1989). Several individuals have been banned from participating in the established parties, and current participants are wary about the frequent changes in the rules of political contestation (The Guardian, 1990). A "cat and mouse" game is being played between banned politicians who remain powerful brokers in their constituencies (and, therefore, command the loyalties of government-approved politicians) and the military, which is determined to block the ambitions of the "old politicians" and let the "new breed" run the show.

The policy of excluding old politicians from politics stems from the general belief that it was the traditional political class that is responsible for wrecking the economy. Most of the prominent politicians of the Second Republic and some business persons were detained during the brief rule of Buhari and Idiagbon, following the overthrow of the Shagari government. Although they subsequently gained their freedom under Babangida, the feeling persisted that old politicians would fundamentally review the adjustment programme and continue with the reckless spending programmes of the past, if they were allowed to get back into power. The manner in which the conflict between the military and the old politicians is being conducted makes it difficult for open democratic rules of bargaining to emerge and get consolidated. The military uses its executive authority to impose new rules; and the politicians use their informal networks and concealed political power to undermine the objectives of the rules.

The problems of establishing democratic frameworks to regulate social conflicts are brought out in bold relief in the area of industrial relations. To be sure, there are several institutions that have been created to regulate industrial disputes. These include the Industrial Arbitration Panel, ad hoc worker-management committees and consultative meetings, and the courts (Yesufu, 1982). But such institutions have either been manipulated by the state and employers or have failed to take into account the current problems of the recession for workers' welfare. Collective bargaining has been suspended; employers arbitrarily dismiss workers, slash take-home pay, and impose levies on dwindling wages (Bangura, 1989). The state has also intervened in industrial relations to weaken workers' organizations and in some cases to arrest unionists.

Some unions have opted for militant methods of protest because of the intransigence of employers and the limitations of the existing institutions for managing disputes. The state has tried to exploit the internal divisions among unionists as a basis to either tilt the internal balance of power in favour of its preferred candidates or to suspend the organization and blunt what it perceives to be a radical union orientation toward the reforms. The rules governing the election of officials to the executive of the Nigeria Labour Congress were set aside in February 1988, in an attempt by the government to impose its will on the leadership of the organization. The transition programme has failed to provide a democratic framework for handling industrial, political and systemic disputes.

4 The former president of the Second Republic, Shehu Shagari, was among the first group of politicians to argue that the only two political parties in Nigeria are the military and the civilians. Some Left intellectuals see sections of the military as capable of providing a vanguard for revolutionary change. For a review see Beckman (1986).

5 The chairman of the Enugu local government council was removed from office in September 1988 for his "actions, utterances and activities".

6 The Nigerian Bar Association ordered its members to boycott all courts in the country for a few days to protest the refusal of the Gongola state governor to respect the ruling that had upheld the petition of two candidates for the posts of two local government areas in the state.

7 Some of the features of institutionalization can, however, be recognized. Babangida is the first military leader to declare himself president; the first to dismiss his second in command; and the first to dissolve the entire Armed Forces Ruling Council; he also makes use of civil patronage to co-opt and neutralize opponents. The press calls him the "Maradona" of Nigerian politics.

8 The decision to democratize came before the abortive military putsch of April 1990. The putsch certainly reinforced calls for the speedy implementation of the transition programme.

9 The most prominent of the new human rights organizations is the Civil Liberties Organization. Its courageous intervention in the struggles for democratic rights earned it a cover story in one of the leading national weeklies, the Newswatch (1989b). Other organizations include the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights and the National Association of Democratic Lawyers.